Since  the UK economy has grown at . percent per year, compared to . percent in the Eurozone.
 Th e growth diff erential in favour of the British economy, previously regarded as the »sick man of Europe«, has even been increasing. Since  the UK has grown twice as fast as the Eurozone's . percent per year. As a result the UK labour market looks distinctly healthier than Europe's. Both the UK and Euroland had around ten percent unemployment in the early s. But UK unemployment has been around fi ve percent since  whilst in Europe it has been has fl uctuating around nine percent. In the UK around  percent of the working age population are in work, as compared to  per cent in the EU-. Moreover provision of jobs in the UK has not been at the expense of improvements in productivity, the basic determinant of the long-term growth of living standards. Since  labour productivity in the UK business sector has been growing about . percent per year, around three times the rate of advance in Europe.
In one sense such comparisons are rather fl attering to the UK. For the UK economy has not been doing outstandingly well. Rather Europe, and in particular the big countries of continental Europe, have been doing extremely badly. Further, inequality rose faster in the UK than in any other EU country since . Th e ratio of incomes ten percent from the top of the distribution to ten percent from the bottom is around . in the UK as compared to three to . in Northern Europe. Even so, thirteen years with UK growth between . percent and . percent, combined with comparatively low unemployment, must seem an enviable record to European countries struggling with stagnation. How has the UK done it?
Th ere are two obvious explanations. Keynesians would argue that the UK, once freed from the straightjacket of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), has benefi ted from ex-pansionary macroeconomic policy whilst Europe has been labouring under the restrictive Maastricht criteria for budget defi cits and European Central Bank (ECB) obsession with infl ation. Th is has allowed aggregate demand to expand more rapidly in the UK, encouraging both employment and investment. A second explanation is that the UK has undergone a more thorough and earlier process of economic »reform«, particularly deregulation of the labour market, product markets and fi nancial markets. Th is is believed to encourage a more vibrant »supply side« of the economy bringing faster growth and rising demand. What does the evidence show?
Th e Demand Side
A glance at the data for interest rates shows that more expansionary monetary policy cannot explain the better growth performance of the UK. Immediately after the UK left the ERM interest rates were lower than in Europe, but from  on the short-term interest rate has been lower in the Eurozone than in the UK in every single year. Moreover since  the infl ation rate has tended to be higher in the Eurozone countries, which has reduced the real interest rate there. Th us in  the short-term interest rate in the UK was . percent in the UK and . percent in the Eurozone, whilst slightly higher infl ation in Europe meant that real interest rates were . percent in the UK and zero in the Eurozone. Of course this comparison cannot show whether the ECB should not have done more by way of cutting interest rates, given the stagnationist tendencies in Europe. It does show, however, that the poorer growth and employment record in Europe than in Britain cannot be blamed on a more restrictive monetary policy.
Th e other arm of macroeconomic policy is fi scal policy -the balance between government spending and revenues. In the s the fi scal patterns in the UK and the Eurozone were rather similar. Very expansionary policies in the early s were followed by extended periods of consolidation. In fact the fi scal squeeze was stronger in the UK, with a six percent of GDP »structural defi cit« in  (that is after adjustment for temporary cyclical factors) being converted into a surplus of one percent in . In the Eurozone the tightening was from a similar defi cit in the early s but the budget never got to within one percent of balance.
Th e tighter fi scal squeeze in the UK in the s was followed by a major fi scal expansion in the period of the second Blair government as the government came under heavy political pressure to improve public services. Th e structural defi cit rose to . percent of GDP in . In the Eurozone there was no signifi cant further increase in the defi cit after . Th us even though fi scal policy looks of secondary importance in explaining growth diff erentials over the whole period, since  the more expansionary fi scal policy in the UK defi nitely played a role in the considerably faster growth in the UK. We will return to the important role of government spending in sustaining UK growth after  after briefl y examining the »supply side« of the equation.
Supply Side Flexibility
Over the period  to , according to the OECD, the UK undertook more product market deregulation (including privatisation and reducing barriers to entry into markets) than any other OECD country, and in  it had the least product market regulation of all the European countries. A ranking of freedom in capital markets showed the UK moving from the seventh place in the OECD in  to the fi rst place in . Finally, the assault on labour market regulations and protection under Mrs Th atcher and her successors has resulted in the UK having the most unregulated and un-supported labour market in Europe. In  the UK ratio of unemployment benefi ts to post-tax income was the lowest in Europe (some  percent as compared to  percent in Germany for example). UK employment protection was the lowest in Europe. Although union membership, at around  percent of employees, was still higher in the UK than in France, Spain and Germany, the coverage of collective bargaining arrangements was only  percent of employees, well under half the coverage rate typical in Europe. At fi rst sight, then, the supply side off ers a more plausible explanation of the UK's superior performance than do monetary and fi scal policy diff erences with Europe. Th is is not mainly Tony Blair's creation; the bulk of deregulation occurred under his conservative predecessors, though generally he has extend ed the process rather than trying to reverse it.
Th e impact of deregulation and reform on economic performance is hugely contentious. Perhaps the least contentious is the idea that greater competition may force fi rms to rationalise and invest in new technology, which is a strong thread in classical economics from Adam Smith through Karl Marx to Joseph Schumpeter. Of course whilst monopoly positions can stifl e dynamism, opening them up to the pressure of competition is far from costless as workers may lose well paid jobs in the industries aff ected and become dependent on a more or less fl exible labour market. So what is the evidence that lightly regulated labour markets like that of the UK generate superior performance in terms of jobs?
Despite the fact that the OECD, the IMF and other international organisations have been consistently pushing for labour market deregulation, at least since the early s, the evidence that high unemployment benefi ts or strong employment protection or high minimum wages is responsible for low employment is very weak. As Baker et al. () show if you compare unemployment rates across OECD countries with the generosity of unemployment benefi ts or the strength of employment protection there is no correlation at all. Countries have reached low unemployment with both low benefi ts or high benefi ts. Th e same is true for employment protection or minimum wages. As this study shows the more sophisticated statistical analyses, which include a range of labour market measures and other infl uences on employment, do not give consistent or »robust« results for the role of benefi ts etc. Labour market deregulation has very uncertain eff ects on unemployment and certainly is not a necessary condition for high employment rates, since countries like Sweden and the Netherlands have achieved very high employment combined with comparatively generous social protection.
Th us whilst the UK economy is certainly very deregulated this does not prove that the resulting »fl exibility« is the cause of high employment. Before trying to draw a fi rmer conclusion, however, we need to examine some more features of the UK economy.
Consumption, Exports and Government Spending
An obvious explanation for fast growth in the UK is that British consumers have been much more willing to go out and borrow to spend as compared to more cautious consumers in Europe. It is true that the savings ratio (proportion of household income saved) is a good deal lower in the UK; at around six percent it compares with savings at about double this rate in the big European economies. But the main explanation for faster growth of consumption is faster growth of incomes, not falling savings ratio or rising borrowing. Just in one year, , a decline in savings in the UK gave a once and for all boost to consumption and staved off an incipient slowdown. Th is was hardly fundamental however.
If the UK was really such a vibrant and competitive economy one would expect a rapid expansion of exports. Indeed the eff ective depreciation of sterling in the early s did generate quite an export boom that helped launch the expansion. Latterly, however, UK exports have stagnated -between  and  export growth in the UK was at about half the rate of allegedly sclerotic Germany. Th e competitiveness of UK manufacturing declined drastically in the later s as sterling appreciated and pushed up UK costs -the result was the overvalued exchange rate for sterling with which any recent visitor to the UK is all too familiar. Th e UK has had a balance of payments defi cit of around two percent of GDP since the late s, contrasting with balance for the Eurozone. Indeed the deficit would have been much greater but for falling prices for imports, from China for example. UK manufacturing has a growing defi cit, partially off set by export success in certain knowledge-based services (fi nance, consulting etc). Clearly international competitiveness and growing exports do not explain the UK's success.
We noted earlier that a strong fi scal expansion has helped the UK economy keep growing since . Indeed this understates the recent impact of government spending. In the three years up to  private sector employment went up just over ,; in the four years after  the increase was only ,. Moreover, this slowdown took place while the government was creating more work for private companies through the substantial increase in public spending.
Since  the government has commissioned construction companies to build new hospitals and schools, spent more on drugs and schoolbooks and employed more catering, cleaning and other private service contractors. Such expenditure has been expanding faster than the public sector's own direct wage bill. Translating this rise in spending into jobs suggests that over the three years  to , some half a million extra private sector jobs were created as a direct result of public spending. So government spending, as well as creating nearly half a million jobs in the public sector since , has been responsible for all recent growth in private sector employment. Th us rising government spending has been directly responsible for all the growth in UK employment since .
Forum
Of course we do not know what would have happened to employment after  without the expansion of public spending. However, the experience of the last four or fi ve years certainly does not support the idea that the UK's recent jobs growth has been the creation of a deregulated and vibrant private sector. A good old-fashioned Keynesian expansion seems much closer to the mark.
Th ere is still one puzzle however. Even if it is granted that rising government spending has been the main motor behind the continued expansion in the UK, why has this not led to an upsurge of infl ation? In the mid s leading economists were estimating that »structural unemployment« (the unemployment rate below which infl ation would take off ) in the UK was eight to nine percent and yet subsequently infl ation has stayed low despite unemployment falling to fi ve percent. If structural unemployment really has fallen like this and if the explanation is deregulation then deregulation would indeed be the fundamental factor explaining the fall in UK unemployment, even if the rise in government spending was also necessary to provide the necessary demand impetus in the economy.
Some people on the left denounce the concept of »structural unemployment« as a reactionary concept designed to pin the blame for mass unemployment on workers and justify labour market deregulation. Whilst it is often used in this way fundamentally the concept is the same as Marx's »reserve army of labour« -the slack in the labour market necessary to hold down wages to levels consistent with capital accumulation. So why has the reserve army fallen in the UK? Recently greater intensity of competition in product markets is often cited as »keeping the lid« on wage increases as employers face more intense competition from overseas. Th is would seem to apply equally in Europe, although the overvaluation of sterling has brought additional pressure on UK fi rms in recent years. Th e Bank of England has also mentioned the rapid infl ow of workers from overseas into the UK, many from Europe, as an additional factor keeping the labour market less tight than the unemployment statistics would suggest. But again this hardly seems a trend specifi c to the UK. Th e factor which most marks out the UK was Mrs Th atcher's assault on trade unions, culminating in the defeat of the miners' strikes. Tony Blair, whilst making a few minor concessions to the trades unions, has conspicuously failed to reverse most of the conservative policies to weaken unions and has defi nitely privileged the interests of business. Th is is not to accept the argument of the deregulators that reducing unemployment benefi t or employment protection will generate more jobs. But in a capitalist economy, distributional confl ict between capital and labour is always an issue and a radical weakening of labour is one way of keeping that confl ict in check without requiring mass unemployment. Th e big countries of continental Europe, unlike some of their smaller North European neighbours, have for complex reasons connected with their institutions and history, failed to fi nd an alternative corporatist solution. Employers and government have not, yet, followed the risky, Th atcherite route of a decisive showdown with labour. It is presumably fear of re-igniting the old wage price spiral which keeps the ECB from the kind of aggressive interest rate cutting in the face of demand weakness that has characterised Alan Greenspan's period as Chairman of the US Fed. Th e Bank of England did not need to do this in the years after  as government expansion was keeping the economy moving.
Th e UK economy looks to be at a turning point with unemployment on the rise. Growth is faltering as the government thrust to demand is weakening and all the talk is of the housing market declines, continued feeble business investment and the worst consumer sales fi gures for  years. Th ere is no sign whatever that a vibrant, deregulated private sector is about to take up the slack. Th e days of Tony Blair and Chancellor Gordon Brown preaching smugly to their European counterparts about the virtues of fl exibility may be numbered.
